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Abstract. The objective of this study is to examine the role of corporate 
governance to increase firm performance. The measure of corporate 
governance are corporate governance mechanism and Corporate 
Governance Perception Index (CGPI). Samples are companies that 
followed CGPI award at 2005-2014. The examination of the relationship of 
corporate governance and firm performance is conducted by regression of 
corporate governance mechanism variables and control variables to 
profitability. Corporate governance mechanisms are board size, board 
independence, outside directors, audit committee size, audit committee 
meeting, audit quality, and CGPI. Control variables are leverage and firm 
size. The results of this study indicate that board independence negatively 
influence profitability, audit committee meeting positively influence 
profitability, audit quality positively influence profitability, CGPI 
positively influence profitability, leverage negatively influence 
profitability, and firm size negatively influence profitability. 
1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is commonly understood as the way and practice to directing, 
organizing, and control the company. Corporate governance is the system designed to 
professionally direct the company based on good corporate governance principles. Good 
corporate governance principles are transparency, accountability, responsibility, 
independence, and fairness.  
The practice of corporate governance is strongly influenced by the parties involved in 
the management system of a company such as shareholders, investors, creditors, 
employees, and government. Good corporate governance is expected to increase firm 
performance. The main objective of the implementation of good corporate governance is to 
optimize value for shareholders and stakeholders  in the long run. 
This research tries to prove that corporate governance that is performed well can 
improve firm performance. Generally, this study is aimed to examine whether corporate 
governance mechanisms and principles influence firm performance. Specifically, the 
objectives of this study are examine the influence of board size, board independence, 
outside directors, audit committee size, audit committee meeting, audit quality, and 
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2 Literature Review  
2.1 Corporate Governance  
Cadbury Report defines corporate governance as “a system in which companies are 
directed and controlled” [1]. The board of directors is responsible for the implementation of 
corporate governance. The role of shareholders in governance is to appoint directors and 
auditors, and ensuring that the directors and the auditor has run the appropriate governance 
structure. While the auditor's role in providing an assessment of the financial statements 
presented by management. 
Corporate governance mechanisms include institutional ownership in the company, 
stock ownership by directors and executive officers, board of directors characteristics, age 
and tenure of the CEO, and the sensitivity of CEO pay-for-performance [2].  
Institutional investors in large numbers will have the opportunity, resources, and 
ability to monitor and influence the manager. Shares and/or options ownership by directors 
and executive officers will encourage behavior that can increase the value of the firm, but 
will also encourage managers to use discretionary accruals to increase firm performance in 
the period around the sale of shares or the use of options, so as to improve the welfare of 
directors and the executive officer [2]. Directors appointed to manage and control the 
business of the company. As an agent of the company and its shareholders, directors must 
protect the interests of shareholders as the owner of the company. Characteristics of the 
board of directors can be measured by the percentage of independent directors (outside 
directors), CEO duality, and the size of the board. Age and tenure of CEO influence the 
effectiveness in managing the company. The older or the longer the tenure of the CEO, the 
deeper understanding of the CEO of the company and industry, and improve the 
performance of the company [2]. 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
P.A. Gompers, L. Ishii,  and A. Metrick found a strong correlation between corporate 
governance and stock returns throughout 1990 and firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q 
[3]. L.D. Brown and M.L. Caylor found that companies that are managed better would be 
more profitable, more valuable, and to pay more cash dividends to shareholders [4].  
Managers tend to expropriate the company's assets and work on projects that benefit 
themselves personally [5]. Effective corporate governance that reduces 'right to control' of 
shareholders and creditors given to managers, increasing the probability that managers 
invest in projects that generate net positive present value [6]. This shows that companies 
that are managed better have a better operational performance, the performance measures 
used by L.D. Brown and M.L. Caylor [4]. Empirically, R. La Porta, F. Lopex-de-Silanes, 
A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny indicate that investor protection associated with effective 
corporate governance [7].  
2.2.1 Board size and firm performance 
There are two opposing ideas on the relationship between board size and firm performance. 
First, thought that the lesser the board size can greatly contribute to the company’s success. 
D. Yermack found an inverse relationship between board size with company's value and 
favorable financial ratios such as profitability, asset utilization, and Tobin's Q [8]. 
Empirical evidence of S. Cheng showed that companies that have more board members, the 
variability of the firm performance would be lower [9].  










The second thought argued that a large board size will increase the firm performance. 
Board size is a determinant of the ability of directors to monitor and control manager. R. 
Adam and H. Mehran argued that the company should have a large board size to be able to 
monitor effectively [10]. Large board size will support a more effective management of the 
company [11]. Large board size will be easier to obtain information [12]. 
Hypothesis 1: Board size influence firm performance 
2.2.2 Board independence and firm performance 
Previous studies of the relationship between the independence of directors and firm 
performance, showed inconsistent results. The higher the proportion of outsider, the more 
independent board of directors [13]. S. Bhagat and B. Black found no association between 
proportion of outsider and Tobin's Q, ROA, asset turnover, and stock returns [14]. 
The composition of board of directors plays an important role in determining the firm 
financial performance. Board of directors is authorized to monitor managerial activities, 
evaluate the performance of managers, and give awards to the manager. According to E.F. 
Fama and M.C. Jensen, board of directors is an internal control mechanism that is essential 
for monitoring top management [15]. 
S. Rosenstein and J. Wyatt found a market award to the company that has the outsider 
[16]. J. Brickley, J. Coles, R. Terry found a positive relationship between the proportion of 
outsider by the reaction of stock market [17]; and R. Anderson, S. Mansi, and D. Reeb 
found the opposite relationship between independence of directors and cost of debt [18]. A 
large number of board and a large proportion of outsider can provide great information. 
Several studies have found that board size and the proportion of outsider positively related 
to firm size and complexity [19].  
L.D. Brown and M.L. Caylor found no relationship between the independence of 
directors and Tobin's Q, but found a positive relationship between the independence of 
directors and ROE, profit margin, dividend yield, and stock repurchases [4]. They found 
that the company would be worth if the position between the CEO and the board are 
separated. S. Rosenstein and J. Wyatt found evidence that shareholder value is influenced 
by the proportion of outside directors as indicated by the positive stock price reaction 
during the announcement of the appointment of outside directors [16]. 
Hypothesis 2: Board independent influence firm performance 
Hypothesis 3: Outside directors influence firm performance 
2.2.3 Audit committee and firm performance 
Audit committee as a committee plays an important role in ensuring and monitoring the 
accounting process so that management can provide information that is relevant and 
credible to all stakeholders [20]. The existence of audit committee independence is able to 
provide reliable accounting information, so audit committee independence is expected to 
improve the company's performance. L.D. Brown and M.L. Caylor found that independent 
audit committee positively related to dividend yield [4]. 
The 1999 Blue Ribbon Committee Report recommends that  audit committee, as 
supervisor of financial accounting processes, conduct meetings at least four times a year in 
order to guarantee the quality of financial reporting [21]. If audit committee size and audit 
committee meeting frequency can improve financial accounting process, it is expected that 
audit committee size and meetings frequency can improve firm performance. 
Hypothesis 4: Audit committee size influence firm performance 
Hypothesis 5: Audit committee meetings influence firm performance 










2.2.4 Audit quality and firm performance 
Audit quality as a means of monitoring corporate governance from the outside, can 
improve firm performance. The study results proved that large auditors have a good 
reputation which reflects the good quality than smaller auditor [22]. Z.V. Palmrose  suggest 
that the big-8 auditors audit charge high fees because of high audit quality [23]. A. 
Martinez, and A. de Jesus Moraes found that auditors imposes higher audit fees will give a 
signal to markets that high audit quality may enhance shareholder value [24]. 
Hypothesis 6: Audit quality influence firm performance 
2.2.5 Corporate governance principles and firm performance 
The principles of corporate governance consists of transparency, accountability, 
responsibility, independence and fairness. IICG (The Indonesian Institute for Corporate 
Governance) create a corporate governance index, known as Corporate Governance 
Perception Index (CGPI). Implementation of good corporate governance is expected to 
improve the company's performance [25].  
Hypothesis 7: Corporate Governance Principles influence firm performance 
 
3 Methodology  
The study period covers 10 years, t = 2005 to 2014. The samples were all companies 
registered for the Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI). Data was obtained from 
secondary data that are CGPI and financial data operiod of 2005-2014. 
The independent variables is corporate governance mechanism and Corporate 
Governance Perception Index (CGPI). Corporate governance mechanisms include number 
of board of directors (BoSize), number of independent board (BoInd), number of outside 
directors (OutDir), umber of audit committee (AcSize), frequency of audit committee 
meetings in a year (AcMeet), and audit quality (Audit). The dependent variable is firm 
performance as measured by profitability. Measures of profitability is return on assets 
(ROA). This study also incorporate leverage (LEV) and firm size (SIZE) as control 
variables. 
The examination of the influence of corporate governance on firm performance is done 
by multiple regression test: 
PROFit= α0 + α1BoSizeit-1 + α2BoIndit-1 + α3OutDirit-1 + α4AcSizeit-1 + α5AcMeetit-1 
+  α6AUDITit-1 + α7CGPIit  + α8LEVit-1 + α9SIZEit-1 +εit   (1) 
where PROF is profitability.  
4 Results 
The samples were all over the listed company (listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange) 
listed as participants of Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) in 2005-2014. Data 
collection are 133 observations. 
Table 1 below is an overview of the results of hypothesis testing. Results shows that 
board independence negatively influence firm profitability. This shows that the independent 
board will potentially reduce the profitability of the company. These results are not 
consistent with previous studies that show that board independence will increase the 
company's performance. Results of previous studies have not been consistent on the 
association of board independence and corporate performance. 
The number of audit committee meetings is found positively influence firm 
profitability. This shows that the more frequent audit committee meetings, the higher 










profitability of the company. The audit committee oversees the ongoing accounting 
procedures so that management can provide information that is relevant and credible to all 
stakeholders [20]. More frequent audit committee meetings is expected to improve firm 
performance. These results are consistent with L.D. Brown and M.L. Caylor were shown a 
link between audit related governance factors and firm performance [4].  
 
Table 1. The association of corporate governance and profitability 
Variable Prediction Coefficient t-statistic Prob-value 
Constant  No 36.13970 2.317005 0.0221 
BoSize + 0.428252 1.091527 0.2771 
BoInd + -0.116002 -2.209253 0.0289 
OutDir + 0.015278 0.510375 0.6107 
ACSize + 0.329015 0.686524 0.4936 
ACMeet + 0.107269 1.991949 0.0485 
AUDIT + 5.877332 3.193858 0.0018 
CGPI + 0.473773 3.169802 0.0019 
LEV - -0.139464 -5.132474 0.0000 
SIZE + -4.982884 -3.180228 0.0018 
Audit quality is found have positive effect on firm profitability. Audit quality as a 
means of monitoring the implementation of corporate governance from the outside, can 
improve firm performance, consistent with A. Ferguson and D. Stokes [22]. Big Auditor 
has a good reputation and produce good audit quality, so as to improve firm performance. 
Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) is found positively influence firm 
profitability. This indicates that the implementation of good corporate governance will 
increase firm profitability, consitent with F. Siagian, S.V. Siregar, and Y. Rahadian that 
found that GCG practice positivelly affect firm value [26]. Implementation of good 
corporate governance is expected to improve firm performance the firm is managed 
transparently and accountable. 
5 Conclusion  
The results indicates that board size does not significantly influence profitability. Board 
independence significantly have negative effect on profitability. Outside director found not 
to significantly affect profitability. Audit committee size did not significantly affect 
profitability. The number of audit committee meetings significantly have positive effect on 
profitability. Audit quality significantly have positive effect on profitability. The principles 
of corporate governance significantly have positive effect on profitability. Leverage and 
firm size have negative effect on profitability.  
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